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IN THE SUPREIViE COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOT'l' COPPER CORP()R.L\..'l'ION EMPLOYEES "'ho were
members of, or represented by,

0~-,

FICE EMI">LOYEES INTERN ATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 286;
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCO~IO
TI\rE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN, LOCAL 844; IN'l'ERN.1lT I 0 N A L ASSOCIATION 01~
MINE, MILIJ AND SM}j~LTER
''TORK.ERS, LOCAL 485,
Petitioners and ApzJellants~

No.
'

9607

vs.

DEPAR'l,l\fENT OF EMPLOYMEN'!, SECURI'.rY OF THE INDUSTRIAL COl\'lMISSION OF
UTAH AND THE BOARD OF
REVIEW,
Defendants and Respondents.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the Decision of the
Industrial Commission of Utah
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A representative of the lrtah Department of
Employment Security issued determinations to the
appellants denying then1 unen1ployment compensation
benefits for an indefinite period beginning August 13,
1961, on the grounds that their unen1ployment was due
to a stoppage of "rork which existed because of a strike
involving their grade, class, or group of workers at the
factory or establishment where they were last employed.
Timely appeal was made to the Appeals Referee who
on September 21, 1961, conducted a hearing and who
on the 27th day of September, 1961, affirmed the decision of the Department representative. On October 4,
1961, the decision of the Appeals Referee was appealed
to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
of Utah. On the 5th day of December, 1961, the Board
of Review issued a decision affirming the decision of
the Referee and the representatiYe. The matter is now
before this Court by reason of a Petition for ''Trit of
Review which \vas filed on the 28th day of December,
1961.
ST.1i'l,EMENT OF FACTS
To the appellants' ''STArJ~EMENT OF FACTS"
must be added the follo,ving: As of 7:00A.M.
August 17, 1961, the Kennecott Copper Corporation, l_Ttah
Copper DiYision, did all those things consistent with
the continuance of normal operations at the mine. ork
schedules were posted, electric power was ayailable,
foren1en had been instructed to put all men to \vork

on

'T
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\vho reported for 'vork, n1en 'vho reported for ,vork
\vere given their reg·ular assignments, and there \vas
\vork for those \\' ho chose to work, and substantial operations at the mine came to a halt only when the great
1najority of the members of the appellant groups did
not report for work as scheduled and, therefore, failed
to be available for their regular assignments.

Srl,ArfEMEN'l'
1 rrHE

o~~

POIN'l,S

0}1_, rl,HE
APPEALS REFEREE AS AFFIRMED BY
rrHE BOARD OF, REVIE"T WHICH ARE
CLAIMED TO BE IN ERROR IN APPELLANT'S POINTS OF A R GUM E N T 1
'l,HROUGH 3 ARE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE AND ARE, THERF~lTORE, CONCLl~
SIVE.
~-,INDINGS

o~~

}1~AC'l,

2. THE CLAIMAN'l'S REPRESENri'ED BY

THE SUBJECT IJOCAIJ UNIONS P AR'fiCIPATED IN THE STRIKE OF, THE ELECTRICAL WORKERS UNION OF AUGUST 17,
1961, BY CONCERTED "\JVI'fHHOLDING 01~
THEIR SERVICES.

OF T H E
CLAIMANTS "WAS DlJE TO A STOPPAGE
OF 'VORK ''THJC,JI EXISTED BECAUSE OF
A STRIKE IN,TOL VING rrHEIR GRADE.
CLASS, OR GROUJ:> OF 'VORI(ERS AT THE
)liNE.
3
3. THE

UNEMPLOYM}~Nrr
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All-GUMENT

POIN'f ONE
1 ,_l,HE

THE
APPEALS REF,EREE AS AFFIRMED BY
1"HE BOARD OF, RE,TIE'V \'\THICH ARE
CLAIMED TO BE IN ERROR IN APPELLAN1"'S POINTS OF A R GUM E NT 1
'fHROUGH 3 ARE SUPPORTED BY E'TIDENCE AND AR}~, THEREFORE, CONCLUSIVE.
~liNDlNGS

O:F'

J:1,AC'l~

0~-,

Section 35-4-10 (i) ~ Utah Code Annotated 1953,
second paragraph, provides in part:
" ... In any judicial proceeding under this
section the findings of the Commission and the
Board of Review as to the facts if supported by
evidence shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction
of said court shall be confined to questions of
l aw ... ''
This Court, follo"ring a long line of workmen's compensation cases involving similar language,
has consistently from time to -time ruled that where the
findings of the Commission and Board of Review are
supported by e\ridence they 'vill not be disturbed. See
Ralph E. Child YS. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security~ 332 P. 2d 928, 8 Utah 2d 239; Creameries of
America, Inc. Ys. The Industrial Commission of Utah
and Robert L. ~-,oss, 102 P. 2d 300, 98 Utah 36~ Employees of Lion c.oal Corporation at
attis, Utah YS.

'T
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'fhe 1 nd us trial l'l <>Ininission of lJ tah and the Lion Coal
Corporation, I l l I>. 2d 797, 100 lJtah 207; 'I'ea1nsters,
c,hauffeurs anti I-Ielpers of .i-~erica YS. Orange 'l,ransportation Con1pany, 296 P. 2d 291, 5 Utah ~d. 4.). See
also Outboard ~Iarine and _Jianufacturing l'ompany
vs. Gordon, 403 Ill. 518, 87 N.E. 2d 619, in 'vhich the
Supreme Court said that it would not disturb findings
of fact of an administrative agency unless they are
manifestly against the weight of evidence or unless
there is no evidence to support them. See also Stillman
vs. lloard of Review, 161 Pa. Super 569, 56 A. id 380,
in which the Court held that it could not disturb findings of fact of the unemployment compensation Board
of Revie'v where they \Vere supported by evidence even
though the record may contain other competent evidence which, had it been accepted by the Board, \Vould
have justified different findings, nor may the Superior
Court substitute its findings for those of the Board.
Before we discuss the evidence and testimony
"Thich support the findings, we wish to point out that
the record contains a stipulation of parties that the
Kennecott Copper Corporation, Utah Copper Division, in Utah is an integrated operation. Therefore,
the question of whether or not it is so integrated merits
no argument on our part.
'fhe findings that appellants 'vithheld their services
are a1nply supported by· the stipulation of parties (R
0047) that for the most part the workers represented by
the unions to which the appellants belonged did not re5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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port for work on the shift commencing at 7:00 A.M.,
August 17, 1961. Witnesses for the appellants supported the stipulation as follows:
Testimony of

~Ir.

Bentley (R 0070):

A_nswer: "'ro my knowledge there were very
few people who went through the picket lines."
(R 0068)

Answer: '' ... There were some individuals
who come and asked for passes.
Question: ''Did you give them passes?
Answer: "We told them we're on strike and
we are advertising· that we are on strike and that
the purpose, that's the only legal thing we've got
is to advertise "re're on strike-a picket line advertises that you're on strike and we'd like everybody to abide by it."
Next, testin1ony of Mr. Flores ( R 0073) :
Question: "'Vhy didn't you work?
Ans,ver: "Because I called my boss that morning 'vhen I heard there was a strike and asked
if I'd go to 'vork that day and he said that the
day shift hadn't reported for work and he says
if the strike isn't settled by 3 :30 he says you
won't be able to 'vork either." (The day shift
was the one starting at 7:00 A.M., August 17,
1961.)

Testimony of l\fr. 'Veidner. He testified (R 0074,
R 0075) that he sa'" pickets at the tunnel and the precipitation plant and decided to go home. He then testified as foll(n,·s at R 0076:
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Question: "'NO\\·, .Ylr. \\r eidner, \"OU testified
that you "·orked on the records of the precipitation plant.
.1\.ns,ver:

~-'.rhat's

right.

Question: "As a matter of fact the precipitation plant operated during the strike, didn't it 1
i\.nswer: ''I found that out, yes.
Question: ~'Do you recall the company asking
the union to furnish some clerks to do some
clerical "'ork after the strike started?
Answer: ""Will you state that again?
Question: "Do you recall a request coming·
from the company to the ur1ion for some clerks
to 'vork after the strike started? After the strike
was going?
Answer: "Just clerks?
Question: "Yes.
Answer: "Yes.
Question: "Do you know what disposition was
made of that reqtiest?
Ans,ver: "None of them worked."
Testimony of

~Ir.

Larsen (R 0078):

Answer: "I started to work. I went as usual
and caught the work bus and rode up to the bus.
'Ve went up and got in the Bingham bus in the
jam. ,-fhe bus turned around and said they were
going back do,vn out of the jam, so I rode it
back down and then I went home at that time.''
(R 0079)

Question: "Jir. Larsen, prior to 7:30 or 8:00
7
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o'clock, did you have any discussion with anyone
about work?
Answer: "No, we didn't. In fact we didn't
really think there would be a strike. We had
heard rumors and one thing and another, but
we didn't know anything about it until we got
up to the picket line. In fact, we were quite surprised about it."
Next, testimony of Mr. Rawlings (R 0080):
Question: "Did you go to work that day?
Answer: "I went with the anticipation of going but we \\rere stopped just below the tram
due to the congestion and we turned around and
parked and "raited arolmd there oh, possibly
for maybe an hour and we didn't see 1nuch activity so 've turned around and went home."
Testimony of l\Ir. Goris (R 0084):
Answer: ''You have to understand here that a
country road leads to the entrance to the machine shop, ifs on a hill, and the pickets were
established at the bottom of the hill.
Question: ''rfhere 'vere a few fellows down at
the bottom of the hill and you didn't get up above
there, did you?
A ns,ver: "N o. "
'festitnony of

~\Ir.

(jayth"\\raite (R 0089) :

Question: '' . . . did any of the members of
your local \vork after 7:00 a.m. on August 17?
Answer: "Yes.

8
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Question: ·~'!'here \vere about nine that \vorked
one or t\vo days.
1\.nswer:

'~One

day, I think."

(It 0091)
'l'he '"'itness testifies:
Answer: "No, I got to correct you there. 'l'he
nine men involved were men 'vho have assignInents to g·o to work at 5 :45 in the morning in
order to transport men in coaches to and from
their respective places of work. Therefore, by
going to work that early in the morning, they
did 11ot even know a strike was in progress, they
did not see anyone, a picket sign or anything,
therefore, they did render service to the company
for that day."
'festimony of :Nir. Dispenza (R 0099):
Question: "Did any of your group go through
the lines and report to work?
Ar1swer: ''Well, I think on the first day, I
think there 'vere a few.''
In answer to a question as to whether or not he had
been contacted by the con1pany for arrangements for
Inen to go to 'vork at the precipitation plant on or
about the time of the strike, Mr. Dispenza replied (R
0099) :

Ans,ver: "Subsequent to that time. If I might
add, the only conversation on the day of the
strike was ''rith regards to the water switchers
and this was a-I went to the company and I
said as mayor of the town I was very interested
in seeing that our people received water. They
furnish us "'ater, and I asked the company rep9
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

resentatives if arrangements had been made for
the water S\vitchers to go to work, which has
been the practice at all times in the case of a
strike. ,-l,he company said that they had not made
any arrange1nents to get passes for those people
and they weren't going to ask for any. However,
if I \vanted to ask them as mayor of the town
that I could and I did this and I went to the
IBE \V and asked them as a spokesman of the
city if they would allow these people to go to
work so that we could have culinary water,
which they did. At a later date the company,
somebody in the company, I don't remember if
it was Mr. Peterson or who it was, but he asked
me if I would ask the IBE\V for passes for the
P .P. Plant workers to go to work. I told them
that in the past it was always the-between the
company and the striking unit to furnish the
passes or 'vho they would furnish the passes to.
I have made mention to the company that if-I
asked the company rather-if they wanted the
guys to go to 'vork at the plant. They said they
did. Then I mentioned to the company that it
should be their place, not mine, to go down and
ask for passes for those people."
Testimony of
ment) (R 0101):

~.Ir.

Kerr (witness for the Depart-

Question: "'Vait just a moment. There were
n1ore than nine reported for work?
Ans,ver: "Yes, quite a few.
Question: ''They "'"ere given assignments?
Ans"'er: "As soon as they "\\rere given assignInents. they left the property. There were others
on the property.

10
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Question: "\ \rhy ~ Did they say 'vhy 1
Aus,ver: "I don't have their reasons why.
Question: "Now. what were their work assignments ? Were they in their regular classification?
Answer: "Y.es."
,.fhe findings that regularly scheduled ,\~ork was
available to the appellants are substantially supported
by the evidence.
,.l,he appellants argue that they failed to report
for work because the co1npany did not have work for
them due to the fact that the electrical workers were
on strike. Most of the witnesses for the appellants testified that in their opinion the company could not operate
,,~ithout the members of the IBEW and that there was
no work for them. As we shall see from the following
testimony, however, some of these same witnesses also
testified that they could have worked at least for a
day or two. At no time prior to the strike did the company commit any overt act or make any announcement
\vhich would indicate to the appellants that in the event
of a strike the plant would be closed. To the contrary,
the evidence supports the findings that work was available. Only after the 7:00 o'clock A.M. shift failed to
report for 'vork as scheduled were any of the appellants
informed that the con1pany could not operate as usual.
In the absence of an overt act on the part of the
company "Thich would lead appellants to believe that
effective "~ith the comn1encement of the strike the com-
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pany would cease operations, we contend that the events
following the appellants' refusal to report for work
are not of particular importance. We hereafter set
forth some of the testi1nony to support the findings that
work was available and that no such overt act was committed.
Testifying for the appellants, Mr. Bentley, an
officer of the IBE,V, said (R 0058):
"We have an open shop agreement."
And later at R 0066 Mr. Bentley testifies:
"Well, we were well aware of the fact that
when we 'vent on strike that we were pitting our
strength against Kennecott's strength. In other
words, we were gambling. We 'vere taking the
calculated risk which we thought was a good
risk that Kennecott would not be able to function without us. We realize that if they were
able to replace us that they had the legal rights
to go out and hire 200 official people to take our
jobs, but 've realized that due to the fact of the
key positions that we held that Kennecott would
not be able to operate without us. For that reason it "rould haYe been foolish for us to have
went on strike if we weren't relatively certain
that Kennecott "rould not be able to operate
WI"thOU t US . • • "
Mr. Kerr. n1ine operations superintendent, testified
in cross-examination ( R 0110) dealing with the question
as to 'vhether or not normal operations require the 200
electricians and said:

"''r

elL if \Ye 'vere without that group, we have
as you "·ell kno\\·. our supervisory force.
e

''T
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also have the prerogative to contract out as 1nuch
of this work as we please to maintain as near
norn1al operation as we can, and we also n1ay, if
we have to, hire to replace that organizatioil.
Question: "But you did none of these things
here except for the amount of some 'vork that
you contract out.
Ans\ver: "We contracted some out, yes.
Question: "Now during the period of this
strike-let's get at it another 'vay. You don't
contend that normal operations could have been
conducted with the 26 supervisors and the work
that you contracted out.
Answer: "I won't contend one 'vay or the
other. All I can say is that it was our intention
to maintain as near normal as we could.
Question: "What is your opinion as to ho\\'
near nortnal you could come with those 26 supervisors?
Ans"rer: "Well, we would have had to have
been in the actual circumstances to be able to
know, but my instrtictions from the management
and my instructions to my supervisors 'vere that
we were going to maintain operations as best ,,.e
could with whatever help we could get. And if
we got a normal work force we'd have done our
best to maintain as near normal operation as 've
could have, utilizing the three prerogatives that
I just mentioned."
On direct examination of Mr. Kerr (R 0101):
Question: "Was there any production 'vork
done on the 17th?
Answer: "Yes, there was. 'Vhen I got through
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making· assignments to those individuals 'vho
were on the property and reported for ~rork, "re
had enough left over that extended work assignments to operate ore shovels and, I belie,ye,
seven trains.''
Question: '''l'hen no men sho,ved up for work.
that you didn't provide work for?
Answer: '".fhat's true."
Mr. Kerr had previously testified supra that there
were others who reported for work but when they were
given assignments turned them down and left the job.
At R 0103:
Question: "'Vas all necessary electrical "·ork
in view of the absence of actual operation crews
done which could be done?
Answer: "'Yes."
In light of the appellants' contention that no work
was available to them, let us examine the testimony of
appellants' witness, l\ir. Dispenza, a member of the
International Association of Mine, ~Iill and S1nelter
Workers Local 485 .....~t R 0097 on direct examination:
Question: "Ho"r many men are covered by
your contract of employment?
Answer: "Between 1100 and 1200, I believe."
Question: "If the--can the tnine operate or
function in the event that the electricians or any
g'roup are not aYnilable for work?
Ans,ver:

"C~an

(~uestion:

it function?

"Yes.
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Answer: "For a short period of ti1ne it could.
Not for very long.
Question: ''Hovt" long would you say~
Ans"\ver: ''A matter of a couple of days."
1,he Referee and the Board of Revie'v g·ave credence to the testimony of ~lr. Kerr, the superintendent,
that had the workers represented by .:\lr. Dispenza
reported for work then the necessary electrical \vork
would have been performed first by the use of the
supervisors and then by contracting "\Vork out and hiring
replacements for the members of the IBE\V. Qb,,iously
the appellants by refusing to make themselves available
for work were unwilling to put the matter of the company's ability to replace the electrical workers to an
actual test. Instead, they preferred to support the strike
of the electrical workers and then argue that the only
reason they were not reporting to work was because
work was not available. Certainly if such was their belief they would have 'vorked the one or two days and
then if the company had been unable to acco1nplish the
electrical work as was necessary, their unemployment
would actually have been then due to the fact that 'vork
was not available. In addition, working for the extra
days would certainly have enabled the mill and smelter
to continue working for an additional period of time
before they ran 011t of ore. We call your attention to the
testimony of the appellants' witness, Weidner, 'vho
testified that he worked on the records of the precipitation plant and respectfully call the Court's attention
that the evidence in the record shows that the precipi-
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· tation plant operated during the strike. Mr. '\r eidner's
work, therefore, as a matter of fact, continued but he
was not available to do it.
Mr. Gaythwaite, a locomotive engineer, testifying
for the appellants on cross-examination at R 0089:
Question: ''As a matter of fact, some of the
locomotives were operated during this strike,
were they not?
Answer: ''Correct.
Question: "That meant the power was on.
Answer: "Correct.
Question: ''It also meant, too, didn't it, that
the Central Traffic Control System was operating1
Answer: "By a supervisor, correct.
Question: "By a supervisor. Now after, did
any of the members of your local work after 7
a.m. on August 171
Answer: "Yes.
Question: "There were about nine that "rorked
one or two days.
Answer: "One day, I think.
Question: ''Now these locomotives that you
operate, they don't break down all at one time
would they·~ As a 1natter of fact, they might not
break down on any particular day. Isn't that
true?
Answer: "'fhat's true, that's true.
Question:
days.

~'They

n1ight run one day or t'Yo
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Answer: "'They n1ight run a week or t\vo
weeks.''
'I'his \vas a strike by a maintenance group-only
about 150 of 200 workers involved \vere doing skilled
\vork. 'l"he company, according to the record, decidetl
that it could repla~e them by the use of supervisors, ne"·
hires, and by the contracting of electrical work to concerns outside the plant.
The history of business is replete with instances
where there are strikes of maintenance units or small
production units and no \vork stoppages result inasmuch as the striking workers are replaced as is legally
pern1issible under existing labor laws.
The preponderance of the testimony supports the
findings that it was the nonavailability of the appellants for work rather than the nonavailability of work
for the appellants which was the direct and impelling
cause of the work stoppage. The Comrnission and the
Board of Review drew the proper inferences from the
evidence and testimo11y. In the case of Ashwell vs.
United States Seat Company, 167 S."W". 2d 950, 952,
the Court said :
" ... If from the testimony two different conclusions may be drawn as to the ultimate fact at
issue,. each of such conclusions or inferences being consistent \vith the testimony and each inconsistent with the other, it remains for the
triers of fact to dra'v the inference and it does
not become a question of law ... ''
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ARGUl\1ENT
POIN'l' TWO
2. THE CLAIMANTS REPRESENTED Blr

THE SUBJEC.T LOCAL UNIONS P ARTICIPATED IN 'l'HE S'fRIKE OF ~rHE ELECTRICAL WORKERS UNION OF AUGUST 17,
1961, BY CONCERTED WITHHOLDING OF
'fHEIR SERVICES.
POIN'l' 'l"'HR.EE
THE UNElVIPLOYl\1EN'l"' OF T H E
CLAIMANTS WAS DUE TO A STOPPAGE
OF WORI{ WHICH EXISTED BECAUSE Ol.,
A STRIKE INVOLVING THEIR GRADE,
CLASS, OR GROUP OF "\tVORKERS AT THE
MINE.
3.

Because the separation of the argument on defendants' points of argun1ents 2 and 3 would necessarily
lead to a considerable duplication of discussion and
citations, we are presenting a single argument on the
two points.
Section 35-4-5 (d)~ l_:tah Code Annotated 1953,
provides:
~'An

individual shall be ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a "·aiting period:
" (d) For any 'veek in "·hich it is found by the
c.onunission that his uneinploytnent is due to a
stoppage of 'vork 'vhich exists because of a strike
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involving his grade, class, or group of \vorkers
at the factory or establishment at which he is or
was last employed."
,.l"o a considerable extent the facts in the instant
case correspond to those in the case of Gus P. Lexe:;,
et al Ys. Industrial Commission of Utah, 243 IJ. 2d 96J,
121 Utah 551. In that case the S"ritchmen's l'" nion of
North America established picket lines at the gates
of the American Smelting & Refining Company plant
and the morning shift of the American Smelting &
Refining Company employees upon encountering the
pickets standing outside the plant did not report
for available 'vork. No dispute of any kind existed
between the Smelting Company and its employees
either as to wages or any condition of employment.
This Court voted with approval the language of a decision by the Oregon Appeals Referee in case No. 46RA-144, quoted at paragraph 8059 of CCH Unemployment Insurance Service which held that even
though claimant is not a member of a striking union,
he expresses interest and participation in the dispute
which creates his unemployment b~r his refusal to cross
the picket line at the factory or establishment where he
was last employed.
Justice Crockett in his decision which concurred
in the result stated:
"Although the inquiry did not proceed upon
the theory that claimants engaged in the strike,
the undisputed facts show that this was the case.
Neither the fact that there 'vas no dispute \vith
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the employer, nor that their work stoppage was
not called a strike, are controlling. A strike is
generally defined to be a concerted action of
employees in withholding services from their
employer. Any such concerted action in refusing
to perform services is a strike, no matter what
the action may be called, nor for whatever purpose it may have been initiated.
" . . . 'fhere is no theory under which such
concerted action in refusing to work can be interpreted and classified as anything other than
a strike. The Legislature has expressly provided
in Section 5 (d) herein-above referred to that
under such circumstances unemployment benefits
shall not be awarded. The wisdom and purpose
of that provision is not our present concern.
"It will be noted that the determination made
in the case of Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Calif. Emp.
Comm., 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P. 2d 921, 935, cited
in the n1ain opinion, was grounded on the fact
that clai1nants left their work because of a trade
dispute. 'l"'he court said: 'Fairly interpreted it
[the statute] disqualified those workers who voluntarily leave their work because of a trade dispute. Co-respondents in this proceeding, in fact,
left their 'vork because of a trade dispute and
are consequentlr ineligible to 1·eceive payments.'
In American Brake Shoe Company v. Frank
Annunzio, etc., 405 Ill. 44, claimants who did
not cross a picket line set up by members of another union "·ere held disqualified, the courts
saying, ' ... that they were either participating
in the labor dispute ... or voluntarily a'vay from
their employment . . . ' The statutes of both
Cn.Iifornin and Illinois include the term 'trade
dispute· "·ith 'strike' ns a disqualification. Note
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also the Oregon Appeals Referee case referred
to in the prevailing opinion 'vhich states clearly
that the basis of the holding is that the claitnant
honoring the picket line is participating in the
dispute. It is submitted that most of the cases
cited by defendants are actually decided on that
ground, "rhich as I have attempted to demonstrate, is the logical basis upon which the a\\·ard
is denied.''
In the case of Olof Nelson Construction Cotnpany,
'!incent-Peterson Construction Con1pany, Gronen1an
& Company, Young & Smith Construction Co1npany,
Utah Construction Company vs. 'l,he Industrial Commission of Utah and the Board of Revie,Y, r\ppeals
Referee and Claims Supervisor of its Department of
Employment Security, 243 P. 2d 951, 121 Utah 525,
this Court said:
" ... ':Vhose conduct is really responsible for
the work stoppage 1 Answering this question may
have its difficulties but it seems to be the only
logical means of getting at the heart of the matter
and resolving the conflict."
The Court continued:
"I think that principle is sound and should be
squarely approved by us so that both labor and
management 'viii kno'v that he who first resorts
to the use of work stoppage as a means of putting
on economic pressure to settle a dispute will be
chargeable with the responsibility of haYing done
so.
"Thus the critical fact to be determined is
,vhether the conduct of labor or management is
the primary and initiating cause of the 'vork
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stoppage, or as phrased by Mr. Justice Schauer
in the McKinley case: ' . . . It was proper to
relate responsibility for the work stoppage to
the party who created its actual and directly impelling cause.' "
.
We have canvassed the leading cases in the uneinployment co1npensation field 'vhich deal with situations
similar to the one we have in this case. 'Ve feel
that most of the cases place undue e1nphasis on the
matter of the benefit claimants failing to appear for
work because of the existence of a picket line. As
pointed out by the witness, Bentley, supra, "A picket
line advertises that you're on strike and we'd like everybody to abide by it." The picket line becomes, therefore,
a formal request for support of the strike by nonstriking
workers and not a barrier to reporting for work. Union
principles require that support. 'Ve quote briefly from
each case. we firmly believe, however, that for the
purposes of disqualifying claimants who refused to
report for work "\Vhen another union is on strike, it is
not necessarily important that we identify the primary
reason for their withholding of their services.
e are
n1ore concerned 'vith the fact that claimants do withhold their services than \Ye ~re "rith the basic underlying
reason for such '"ithholding ,,. hen the employer makes
work available.

''r

In the case of Bro\vn vs. l\Iaryland Unemployment
Co1npensntion ]~oard, .'55 A. 2d 696, 701, the Court said:
~'If

the clain1ant participated in the strike at
all by refnsing to cross the picket line for one or
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two days \vhen \York \Vas available, they participated in the strike for its entire duration ...
and refusal to cross the picket line being a voluntary act . . . they must accept the consequences
of that refusal."
In the case of Myer vs. Industrial Commission of
~Iissouri, 223 S.\V. 2d 835, the Court concluded that
an employee who voluntarily refuses to cross a picket
line to go to work is participating in a stoppage of \Vork
within the meaning of the unemployment compensation
law so as to be precluded from obtaining benefits thereunder regardless of the fact that he 1nay not profit from
the strike. See also Urbach vs. Board of Review, 83
A. 2d 392.
In the case of Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. vs. Maryland E1nployment Security Board, 121 A. 2d 198, the
Court said:
"It is well settled that a voluntary failure or
refusal by workers, members of a nonstriking
union, to pass through a picket line established
by members of another union at the place of
employment, constitutes participation in the labor dispute. Bro,vn vs. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, 189 Md. 233, 243,
and cases cited. This rule is in accord with the
great weight of authority.
"See also Dante J. Cottini, et al, Appellees
vs. Roy F. Cummins, Director of Labor, 8 Ill.
2d 135, 133 N.~~. 2d 263. See also McGann vs.
Board of Review, 163 Pa. super 379, 62 A. 2d
87."

In the case of Bodinson jlanufacturing Company
23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vs. California Employ1nent C.ommission, 17 Cal. 2d
321, 109 P. 2d 935, a strike was called by the welders'
union. Machinists in the same plant who did not go on
strike, refused to pass through the picket line which
the striking welders had established around the plant.
The Court said:
'' I11 brief, disqualification under the Act depends upon the fact of voluntary action and not
the motives which lead to it. The Legislature
did not seek to interfere with union principles
or practices. rl"he A.ct merely sets up certain conditions as a prerequisite to receive compensation
and declares that in certain situations the worker
shall be ineligible to receive compensation. Fairly
interpreted, it \Vas intended to disqualify those
workers who voluntarily leave their work because
of a trade dispute. Correspondents in these proceedings, in fact, left their work because of a
trade dispute and are consequently ineligible to
receive benefit payments."
"
In the case of Alnerican Brake Shoe Company vs.
}-,rank Annunzio, etc.~ 405 Ill. 44, 90 N.E. 2d 83 to
84 referred to by Justice Crockett in the Lexes case
supra, the Court stated:
"This case presents squarely for determination
the question of whether the failure to cross a
picket line established by· other employees of the
same e1nployer precludes employees who fail to
cross the picket line from unemployment compensation benefits "\\ hen those employees are
members of an entirel~r different labor organization and ha,,.e no interest in or connection with
the labor dispute resulting in the picketing of the
employer's establishment."
7
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At page 85 the Court said:

"In this case it appears that the die sinkers
could have entered their place of employ1nent
'vithout sustai11ing bodily harm and this Court
will not assume that picketing will normally
bring violence; therefore, it appears to us that
the die sinkers voluntarily remained a\Yay fro1n
their employment because they did not care to
be classified as 'scabs' by fellow employees, since
the fear of such classification appears to be their
motivation for their failure to cross the picket
line or voluntarily remaining away from their
employment, either of which 'vould disqualify
them from compensation benefits. The die sinkers are unemployed solely because in accordance
with their union principles they did not choose
to work in a plant wb_ere certain employees from
another plant of their employer were conducting
picketing.''

CONCLUSION
In the instant case, most of the workers who testified stated that they approached the entrances to the
mine, that they observed picket lines and traffic jams
and turned around and went home. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that the claimants chose to involve
themselves in the strike by withholding their services,
even to the extent of walking off the job after they had
been given their regular work assignments. It is our
position that regardless of the reason which formed the
basis for the appellants' withholding of their services
they involved themselves In a strike "·hen they failed
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to perform their regular available work. 'I'he fact of
the matter is that those fe,v who did report and who
remained to work did work on their regular assignments
in a plant where operations were below normal for the
reason that the appellants refused to make themselves
available for work. The appellants were involved in the
strike which caused the work stoppage and were properly held to be ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.
Respectfully submitted,

A. PRATrr KESLER
Attorney General
FRED F. DREl\1"""L\_NN

Special Assistant Attorney General
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